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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-1199 
 ___________ 
 
 ABRAHAMSEN, ET AL.; ANDREASSEN ET AL.;  
 ARNE AASEN ET AL.; AND AARSLAND ET AL. 
 Appellants 
 v. 
 
CONOCOPHILLIPS, CO. 
 
 ___________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of Delaware 
 (D.C. No. 1-10-cv-00692) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Gregory M. Sleet 
 ___________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
OCTOBER 31, 2012 
 
 Before:  SLOVITER, AMBRO and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Filed: November 1, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
The Plaintiffs in four cases filed under Delaware state law, Abrahamsen et al., 
Andreassen et al., Arne Aasen et al., and Aarsland et al. (“Plaintiffs”), appeal from the 
District Court‟s dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds of their claims against 
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ConocoPhillips Company (“Conoco”).  Because we find that federal subject-matter 
jurisdiction does not exist in this case, we will vacate the order of the District Court and 
direct the District Court to remand the matters to state court.   
Background 
Plaintiffs are four groups of Norwegian citizens, totaling 123 persons, who 
brought four separate complaints against Conoco in Delaware state court for injuries 
sustained while working on rigs, platforms, and vessels in the North Sea for Conoco.
1
   
Conoco removed all four suits to the Delaware District Court based on the jurisdictional 
provision of the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) and on federal question 
jurisdiction.   See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(d), 1446, 1453.  Conoco then moved for 
dismissal of the actions on forum non conveniens grounds.   
Plaintiffs filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1447(c) to remand to state court 
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.   Rather than decide the motion to remand, the 
District Court exercised its discretion under Sinochem Int’l.  Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l. 
Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007), to bypass the jurisdictional inquiry in favor of 
a non-merits dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds.  (1 App. 4-6)  
 In Sinochem, the Supreme Court stated: 
If . . .  a court can readily determine that it lacks jurisdiction over 
the cause or the defendant, the proper course would be to dismiss 
on that ground.  In the mine run of cases, jurisdiction will involve 
no arduous inquiry and both judicial economy and the consideration  
                                              
1
 Most Plaintiffs are former employees or contractors; some are family members and 
estates of Conoco‟s former employees and contractors.   
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ordinarily accorded the plaintiff‟s choice of forum should impel 
the federal court to dispose of [jurisdictional] issue[s] first.  But 
where subject-matter . . . jurisdiction is difficult to determine, and 
forum non conveniens considerations weigh heavily in favor of 
dismissal, the court properly takes the less burdensome course. 
 
Id. at 436 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the dismissal of their claims was erroneous and 
that the District Court should have remanded the cases to state court for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction.   
Introduction 
We have an independent obligation to address our subject-matter jurisdiction.  See 
Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 76-77 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that subject-
matter jurisdiction is non-waivable and can be raised by the court sua sponte).  That 
obligation here entails the authority to examine jurisdictional issues that the District 
Court chose to bypass, relying on Sinochem.
2
   
CAFA Jurisdiction 
CAFA grants the federal courts removal jurisdiction in “class action[s],” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1453(b), which it defines to include “„mass action[s]‟ . . . in which monetary relief 
claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the 
plaintiffs‟ claims involve common questions of law or fact.”  28 U.S.C. § 
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 The Ninth Circuit has exercised this authority in a similar situation.  See Provincial 
Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc.582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009).  
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1332(d)(11)(B)(i).  The mass action provision specifically excludes jurisdiction over 
cases in which “claims are joined upon motion of a defendant.”  28 U.S.C.  
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(II).   
When a “statute‟s language is plain” we must “enforce it according to its terms” as 
long as the result “is not absurd.”  Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters 
Bank, N.A. 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (quotation marks omitted).   The plain text of CAFA 
clearly precludes jurisdiction in this case.  Despite the similarities of their claims, 
Plaintiffs did not propose to try their claims jointly.  Because each suit includes fewer 
than one hundred persons, none of Plaintiffs‟ four suits meets CAFA‟s definition of a 
“mass action” and therefore no suit qualifies for removal jurisdiction.3  The clear lack of 
jurisdiction is underscored by CAFA‟s explicit exemption from jurisdiction of suits in 
which “the claims are joined upon motion of a defendant.”  28 U.S.C.  
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(II).
4
   
  This reading of CAFA is not “absurd.”   It is consistent with the well-established 
rule of deference to plaintiffs‟ choice of forum and the presumption against federal 
removal jurisdiction. See Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 862 F.2d 38, 45-46 (3d Cir. 
                                              
3
 The law explicitly denies jurisdiction for “claims  [which] have been consolidated or 
coordinated solely for pretrial proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(IV). 
 
4
 Other courts considering similar facts have also found no jurisdiction under CAFA‟s 
“mass action” provision.  See Anderson v. Bayer Corp., 610 F.3d 390, 392 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that CAFA removal jurisdiction did not apply in a case involving 396 plaintiffs 
who filed four “mostly identical complaints in state court”); Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 
561 F.3d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no removal jurisdiction in case in which 664 
West African foreign nationals filed seven suits, each with fewer than one hundred 
plaintiffs). 
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1988); Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch & Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006, 1010 (3d Cir. 
1987).
5
  We therefore conclude that CAFA does not provide removal jurisdiction in this 
case. 
Federal Question Jurisdiction 
This case also falls outside of our federal question jurisdiction.  Conoco argues 
that the Plaintiffs‟ suits raise a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because they  
“ „implicat[e] . . . our relations with foreign nations,‟ ” and thus raise questions under 
federal common law.  Appellee‟s Resp. Br. at 51 (quoting Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff 
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981)).  Federal-common-law-of-foreign-relations 
jurisdiction is rarely recognized by federal courts, especially for private disputes between 
private citizens and entities.  Even if we were to adopt the reasoning of the circuits with 
the broadest jurisdictional standards, we would not find jurisdiction in this case.  Those 
circuits require intervention in the case by a foreign sovereign and proof that the lawsuit 
will significantly affect the foreign government‟s vitality.  See, e.g., Pacheco de Perez v. 
AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1376-78 (11th Cir. 1998); Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 
113 F.3d 540, 542-43 (5th Cir. 1997).  Because Norway has not intervened here, the 
Norwegian government‟s “sovereignty over all petroleum-based activities in its territorial 
                                              
5
 Conoco argues that reading CAFA to deny jurisdiction in this case “elevate[s] form over 
substance” and encourages jurisdictional “gamesmanship.”  Appellee‟s Br. at 48, 49.  
Even if true, these concerns are insufficient to militate against a plain reading of CAFA.  
See First Merchants Acceptance Corp. v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 198 F.3d 394, 403 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly absurd results and „the most extraordinary showing of contrary 
intentions‟ justify a limitation on the „plain meaning‟ of . . . statutory language.” (quoting 
Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984))).  
6 
 
waters and on its Continental Shelf,” Appellee‟s Resp. Br. at 51, is insufficient to 
generate federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.    
Conclusion 
 
There is no federal subject-matter jurisdiction in this case.  We will therefore 
vacate the forum non conveniens dismissal and remand to the District Court with 
instructions to remand to state court.  
